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In the years following the historic 1989, academic discussions about the future of the countries in 
Central-Eastern Europe (CEE) were mainly focused on the challenges of their political and economic 
reforms. Democratic governance and market economy were widely perceived as the basic coordinates 
defining  the  course  of  their  post-communist  development.  At  the  same  time,  general  interest 
for the process of their state (re)building in this period was much smaller. Only recently has this 
particular aspect of the CEE countries’ transition from communism begun to receive more scholarly 
attention (Ganev, 2007; Kitschelt, 2003; O’ Dwyer, 2006). With her 2007 book Rebuilding Leviathan: 
Party Competition and State Exploitation in Post-Communist Democracies, Anna Grzymala-Busse has 
contributed immensely to this emerging strand of research.  
Grzymala-Busse examines the reconstruction of state institutions and authority in the new CEE 
democracies – Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, and 
Bulgaria – within the fifteen years from the breakdown of communism to their EU accession1. She 
finds that one of the main features of this process was state exploitation by the governing parties. On 
the one hand, with full political legitimacy and few institutional constraints, they played a key role in 
the structural rebuilding of these countries. On the other hand, poorly organised, with a small number 
of members, and no certain sources of income, they were in desperate need of electoral and material 
support. Under such circumstances, as Grzymala-Busse points out, the state represented “the most 
lucrative and readily wellspring of material resources”, and hence “an inevitable target of governing 
parties seeking material assets” (p. 31). Therefore, being the key architects of state reconstruction, 
these parties used the process in order to establish long-term access to state resources and so ensure 
political survival. In the author’s words, “rebuilding the post-communist Leviathan – the structures of 
the state – thus comprised both competition and exploitation” (p. 2).      
In addition, Grzymala-Busse reminds that in the early phase of post-communist transition, both the 
strength of domestic institutions and the influence of international organisations in the CEE countries 
were too weak to effectively constrain their governing parties. For that reason, the extent to which 
the incumbents were able to exploit these states, according to the author, could only be determined 
by their competition with other political actors. However, she makes clear that party contestation 
per se was not enough to place limits on the incumbents’ extraction of state resources. For that to 
happen, she says, ruling parties had to be faced with a credible risk of replacement. In that situation, 
namely, they would “rather constrain themselves, and all subsequent governments, than allow their 
successors to have access to state resources” (p. 81).
 At this point, Grzymala-Busse emphasises – thereby presenting her most important theoretical 
argument - that, in order to create such a threat to incumbents, party competition had to be robust, 
i.e. “characterized by an opposition that is clearly identifiable, plausible as a governing alterative, 
and vociferously critical, constantly monitoring and censuring government action” (Ibid). The author 
persuasively argues that only this kind of political alternative could make parties in office worry about 
the possibility of losing in the next elections, and, consequently, create a mechanism of constraint on 
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trajectories of post-communist state building in the CEE countries. Thus, in new democracies that 
experienced robust competition (Slovenia, Poland Hungary, Estonia, and Lithuania) the level of state 
exploitation was much lower than in those countries where, for different reasons, it was missing for 
most of their transition (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Latvia, and Bulgaria). Interestingly, with the 
exception of Estonia, Grzymala-Busse finds the main source of robust competition in these states in 
former communist parties that, after exiting office, managed to reform and reinvent themselves as 
committed and credible democrats.       
The author recognises three main forms of state exploitation i.e. three arenas in which governing 
parties could ensure their political survival in post-communist states: the creation of state institutions 
of oversight and monitoring, the discretionary expansion of state administration employment, and the 
appropriation of privatisation profits and unregulated public subsidies (p. 4). Therefore, after shortly 
presenting the aforementioned arguments in the introductory part of the book, she continues with 
their further theoretical elaboration and empirical validity testing in each of these state domains. 
In chapter 2, Grzymala-Busse explains why, among various tactics for political survival, governing 
parties  in  post-communist  democracies  dominantly  opted  for  state  exploitation.  Their  strategic 
choice, according to the author, was determined by the degree of their commitment to democratic 
rules of competition, and local organisational resources at their disposal (p. 31). Thus, being loyal to 
the idea of democratic pluralism as an institutional guarantee against the possibility of relapse into 
one-party hegemony, the incumbents could neither fuse with the structures of state nor predatorily 
extract its resources without their further redistribution. Moreover, given their weak infrastructure 
and scarce membership, they were also unable to create clientelistic networks based on the exchange 
of electoral support for the provision of private goods (p. 35). Therefore, in pursuit of resources, these 
parties chose to exploit the state through extraction of its assets.
Having said this, Grzymala-Busse points out that the level of state exploitation by ruling parties considerably 
diverged across the CEE post-communist countries. By comparing two aforementioned clusters of states, 
the author shows that the diversity in terms of their functional demands and institutional deficits inherited 
from the ancien régime may not serve as an adequate explanation of the variation. Instead of these 
structural factors, she hence focuses on political contestation among parties in the legislatures as the 
main architects of state reconstruction in the new democracies (p. 49). Yet, unlike most scholars dealing 
with party competition, Grzymala-Busse does not rely on its common indicators, such as fragmentation, 
ideological polarisation, electoral turnover/party system openness, volatility, etc. Instead, the author takes 
a completely new approach to this problem, convincingly arguing that the extent to which the ruling 
parties in these post-communist democracies were able to exploit the state was dominantly influenced 
by the robustness of political competition, i.e. the power of parliamentary opposition to constrain their 
behaviour. By confirming a high negative correlation between these two variables (-.85), she clearly shows 
that in those countries where the opposition parties were a clear and plausible governing alternative, 
the incumbents, threatened by the possibility of electoral replacement, did not take full advantage of 
privileged access to resources of state in the course of its reconstruction.
One of the main reasons for that, according to Grzymala-Busse, relates to the rise of new formal 
state  institutions  in  CEE  democracies  (national  accounting  offices,  civil  service  laws,  auditing 
chambers, ombudsmen, etc.), providing insight and control of party behaviour (p. 82). As she points 
out in chapter 3, “faced with a high risk of losing next elections, they [incumbents] would want to 
constrain the opposition by creating new institutions of monitoring and oversight so that no successor 
would benefit from the state” (p. 97). This way, robust political competition led governing parties to 
embark on the process of post-communist institutional building, thereby tying their own hands and 
limiting their leeway in disposing and redistributing state resources (p. 81). 
Moreover, contrary to some theories, Grzymala-Busse argues that the diverse patterns of state 
institutional  construction  in  CEE  democracies  could  not  be  determined  by  the  influence  of  the 
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political pressures aimed at improving administrative capacities of these states came too late for the 
frontrunners of state building which had already been erected the basic institutional framework (p. 
90). At the same time, the EU leverage on the countries that considerably delayed this process was 
mostly passive and too inconsistent to bring about implementation of the administrative reforms. 
The  process  of  formal  state  institutions  building,  as  Grzymala-Busse  explains  in  chapter  4, 
was  followed  by  the  efforts  of  governing  parties  to  increase  the  access  to  state  resources  and, 
by extracting them, ensure future political gains (p. 133). In that respect, she identifies two main 
exploitation strategies used by the incumbents in CEE democracies. The first one was based on 
unrestricted expansion of state administration, i.e. “the unregulated and unmonitored growth in the 
number of those employed in the central state ministries, regulatory and tax agencies, social security 
administration, and their territorial offices” (p. 133). Subsequent to the 1989 regime change, due to 
the lack of civil service regulation inherited from the communist era, new ruling parties could freely 
‘pack’ the administration with loyal staff and, thus, control both the state resources and the decision-
making power (p. 162). At the same time, the second mechanism of state exploitation employed by 
the incumbents comprised the creation of numerous new quasi-public agencies, such as privatisation 
agencies, regulatory commissions, health insurance boards, etc. Having a vast range of competencies, 
such  as  granting  concessions,  administering  privatisation,  public  funds  distribution,  and  welfare 
provisions, these parastatal organisations were also managed by people of trust to the ruling parties. 
Finally, in the last chapter, the author analyses different funding strategies of political parties in CEE 
democracies. In the early phase of post-communist transition, the political survival of these parties 
– with almost no resources of material support, impoverished and fickle electorates and private 
companies mainly uninterested in financing them – was highly uncertain. Under such circumstances, 
as Grzymala-Busse points out, they recognised the state, i.e. the extraction of its assets, as the most 
attractive and stable source of funding (p. 182). In this sense, she differentiates between the two basic 
types of state extraction by political parties: formal and informal. And while explaining the former 
in  terms  of  party  financing  through  direct  state  subsidies,  including  parliamentary  subventions, 
electoral campaign funding, and funding for the maintenance of party offices and staff, the author 
calls attention to the latter, as potentially much more lucrative (p. 188). At the same time, she shows 
that the actual level to which the ruling parties could informally extract the resources of state was 
strongly influenced by the character of political competition. 
Anna Grzymala-Busse sheds new light on the post-1989 transition of Central-Eastern European 
countries. Unlike most of her colleagues, who focus on their democratic and economic reforms, she 
follows the course of their state (re)building after the collapse of communism. She shows that due 
to enormous policy-making power resulting from the institutional weaknesses of CEE democracies 
and the lack of external restrains on their actions, political parties played a central role in this 
process. Moreover, striving to ensure political survival, these parties could accordingly use the state 
reconstruction to establish longer-term access to its assets as the most stable source of funding. In 
this respect, the robust political competition as a component of “the very democracy that gave rise to 
these political parties”, could significantly constrain their exploitation of the state (p. 222).
Keeping all this in mind, I rest assured that Grzymala-Busse deserves a lot of credit for both the 
contribution to the related literature and, in particular, the originality of her main argument. By 
emphasising the importance of party competition on shaping the character of state-building processes 
in the CEE democracies, she presents a completely new theoretical perspective on the post-communist 
transition of these countries. At the same time, by confirming a very high correlation between the 
robustness of the competition and the level of state exploitation by the main actors, she proves its 
strong empirical foundation.
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